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Firms’   increasing  possibilities   to  offshore   jobs   to  other   countries  have   created  new  risks  as  
well   as   new   opportunities   for   workers   across   the   world.   We   analyze   the   political   conse-­‐‑
quences  of  this  development  in  advanced  capitalist  democracies.  Building  on  new  develop-­‐‑
ments   in   trade   theory,  we   argue   that   low-­‐‑skilled   individuals   in   easily   offshorable   occupa-­‐‑
tions  face  increasing  labor  market  risks,  whereas  highly  educated  individuals  mainly  benefit  
from   the  opportunities  generated  by   the   increasing  possibility   to  organize  production  pro-­‐‑
cesses   internationally.   This   affects  workers’   policy   and   partisan   preferences.   Since   job   off-­‐‑
shorability  increases  low-­‐‑skilled  workers’  demand  for  social  and  economic  protection,  it  in-­‐‑
creases  their  propensity  to  vote  for  left  parties.  Among  high-­‐‑skilled  workers,  higher  levels  of  
job  offshorability  should  increase  their  their  tendency  to  vote  for  liberal  and  center  parties.  In  
contrast,   offshorability   should  not  be  an   important   issue   for  partisan  preferences   for   right-­‐‑
wing   and   green   parties.   We   test   our   argument   with   individual-­‐‑level   data   from   multiple  
waves  of  the  European  Social  Survey  for  a  sample  of  25  countries  and  find  evidence  in  favor  
of  our  hypotheses.  This  suggests  that  globalization  has  the  potential  to  directly  affect  demo-­‐‑
cratic  policymaking  in  capitalist  democracies.  
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1. Introduction  
  
The  globalization  of  production  has  had  significant  consequences  for  individuals  across  the  
world.  Although  a   robust   finding   in  economics   research   is   that   the   free  exchange  of  goods  
increases  aggregate  welfare,  an  equally  robust  result  is  that  it  creates  winners  and  losers.  The  
effects  of  these  distributional  consequences  on  politics  have  been  extensively  studied  for  free  
trade  (e.g.,  Beaulieu  2002;  Hays  2009;  Hays  et  al.  2005;  Hiscox  2002;  Mayda  and  Rodrik  2005;  
Rogowski  1989;  Scheve  and  Slaughter  2001).   In  contrast,   research  so   far  has  paid  relatively  
scant  attention  to  one  aspect  of  the  globalization  of  production  that  has  featured  prominently  
in  the  public  debate  in  recent  years:  the  phenomenon  of  offshoring.  
Offshoring  is  defined  as  “the  migration  of  employment  from  [one  country]  to  other  (mostly  
poorer)   countries”   (Blinder   2009:   41).   The   enormous   technological   advances   of   recent   dec-­‐‑
ades  have   increasingly  enabled   firms   to  move  production  abroad,   creating   competition   for  
workers  not  only  from  foreign  firms,  but  also  within  their  own  firms.  Importantly,  offshoring  
not   only   affects   employees   of   manufacturing   firms,   which   increasingly   build   factories   in  
countries  with  low  labor  and  production  costs,  but  is  a  phenomenon  that  now  affects  many  
service  sector  employees  (Head  et  al.  2009;   Jensen  and  Kletzer  2010).  Call  center  assistance,  
accounting   services,   or   IT   support   are   increasingly  provided  by   individuals   located   in   for-­‐‑
eign  countries.  As  a  result,  many  groups  of  white-­‐‑collar  workers  that  traditionally  have  been  
sheltered   from   international   competition   have   suddenly   become   very   exposed   to   global  
competition,  a  trend  that  is  likely  to  intensify  in  the  future  (Blinder  2006;  Crinò  2009).  
The  number  of  workers  directly  affected  by  this  facet  of  globalization  has  thus  increased  con-­‐‑
siderably   in   recent   years,   and   this  development  has  not   gone  unnoticed  by   these  workers.  
Although  research  specifically   focusing  on   the  effects  of  offshoring  on   individuals’  percep-­‐‑
tions  and  policy  preferences  is  relatively  rare,  those  studies  that  exist  suggest  that  offshoring  
increases  feelings  of  insecurity  and  demands  for  more  protection  amongst  affected  workers.  
In  a  study  focused  on  Britain,  Scheve  and  Slaughter  (2004)  show  that  individuals  employed  
in   industrial  sectors  characterized  by  high  levels  of   foreign  direct   investment  (FDI)  and,  by  
implication,   a  higher   risk  of   offshoring  view   their   jobs   as   less   secure   than   individuals   em-­‐‑
ployed  in  sectors  where  production  is  purely  domestic.  Walter  (2010)  replicates  this  result  for  
Switzerland  and  shows  that  it  holds  not  just  for  the  sectoral  concentration  in  FDI  but  also  for  
an  occupational  measure  of  offshorability.  Mansfield  and  Mutz  (2013)  argue,  in  contrast,  that  
in  the  US,  opposition  to  offshoring  is  a  reflection  of  a  broader  worldview  that  defines  people  
as  “us”  vs.  “them”,  rather  than  a  reflection  of  the  material  consequences  of  offshoring.  Tak-­‐‑
ing   a   broader   perspective,  Walter   and  Maduz   (2009)   and  Walter   (2014)   investigate   cross-­‐‑
national  survey  data  from  16  West  European  countries  and  report  that  low-­‐‑skilled  individu-­‐‑
als   in  potentially  offshorable  professions  not  only   feel  more  economically   insecure  but  also  
have  a  stronger  preference  for  redistributive  policies.  
The  finding  that  offshoring  has  noticeable  effects  on  individual  perceptions  of  insecurity  and  
on   individual  policy  preferences  raises   the  question  whether  and  how  the  offshoring-­‐‑trend  
has  the  potential  to  affect  national  politics  in  advanced  democratic  economies.  Evidence  from  
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single  country-­‐‑studies  suggests  that  the  answer  to  this  question  is  yes.1  Most  studies  focus  on  
the  US,  where  offshoring  and  outsourcing  has  been  a  highly  politicized  issue  (Mankiw  and  
Swagel   2006).  Margalit   (2011)   finds   that   offshoring-­‐‑related   job   losses   in   the  manufacturing  
sector  at  the  county-­‐‑level  led  to  significant  reductions  in  electoral  support  for  the  incumbent  
in  the  2004  US  presidential  elections.  In  a  study  focused  on  the  US  motion  picture  industry,  
Chase   (2008)   demonstrates   that   offshoring   has   increased   labor-­‐‑group   lobbying   for   policy  
measures  designed   to   limit   the  production  of  movies  abroad  by  groups   threatened  by   this  
development.  Walter  (2010)  shows  that  in  Switzerland,  individuals  threatened  by  offshoring  
were  more  likely  to  vote  for  the  Social  Democratic  party  than  individuals  who  benefit  from  
this   trend.  While   insightful,   these   studies   leave   open   some   important   questions:  Does   off-­‐‑
shoring  have  an  impact  on  individual  voting  behavior  across  a  broader  set  of  countries?  Do  
globalization  winners  and  losers  actually  have  distinct  partisan  preferences?  And  do  the  ef-­‐‑
fects  of  offshoring  on  individual  labor  market  risks  equally  affect  different  party  families?  
This  paper  aims   to  advance  our  understanding  of   these  questions.  Building  on  existing   re-­‐‑
search  that  shows  that  job  offshorability  affects  highly  qualified  and  poorly  skilled  individu-­‐‑
als  differently,   it   argues   that   the   offshoring   trend   influences   the   constituencies   of  different  
party  families  unequally.  Since  highly  skilled  individuals  tend  to  benefit  from  the  opportuni-­‐‑
ties   of   offshoring,   they   should   show   a   greater   preference   for   liberal   parties   that   advocate  
economic  openness  and  international  competition  when  they  work  in  potentially  offshorable  
occupations.  In  contrast,   labor  market  risks  for  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals  increase  with  higher  
levels   of   offshorability,   so   that   low-­‐‑skilled   workers   in   potentially   offshorable   occupations  
should   vote   for   the   social   protection   and   compensation   that   left   parties,   especially   social  
democrats,  promise.  Offshorability  should  play  a  lesser  role  for  centrist  parties,  because  they  
are   not   perceived   as   the   most   credible   proponent   of   free-­‐‑market   policies.   In   contrast,   it  
should  play  no  decisive  role  concerning  right-­‐‑wing  and  green  parties,  because  the  former  put  
immigration  issues  as  a  different  aspect  of  globalization  into  the  center  of  their  attention  and  
the  latter  put  more  salience  on  issues  other  than  globalization.  
Empirically,  this  paper  utilizes  cross-­‐‑national  survey  data  from  25  advanced  European  econ-­‐‑
omies  over  the  time  period  from  2002  to  2010  to  examine  how  the  phenomenon  of  offshoring  
has   affected   electoral   politics.   Our   results   show   that   exposure   to   offshoring-­‐‑induced   risks  
and   opportunities   has   significant   effects   on   individual   voting   behavior   that   vary   with   an  
individual’s   educational   background:   Individuals  with   potentially   offshorable   occupations  
are  more  likely  to  vote  for  left  parties  when  they  have  a  comparably  low  level  of  education  
and  more  likely  to  vote  for  liberal  and  center  parties  when  they  are  well  educated.  Offshor-­‐‑
ing   risks   and  opportunities  play   a  much   lesser   role   for   the   electoral   support   of   right-­‐‑wing  
and  green  parties.  Therefore,  our  findings  support  recent  research  that  the  effects  of  globali-­‐‑	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  This  also  resonates  with  existing  research  on   the  effects  of  globalization  on  electoral  politics.  Here,  
several  studies  find  that  (openness-­‐‑induced)  job  insecurity  increases  the  likelihood  that  an  individual  
will  vote  for  parties  that  run  on  an  anti-­‐‑globalization  platform  (Mughan  et  al.  2003;  Mughan  and  Lacy  
2002).  Although,  other  authors  find  that  economic  internationalization  reduces  the  impact  of  economic  
considerations   on   voting   choices   altogether   (Duch   and   Stevenson   2008;   Fernandez-­‐‑Albertos   2006;  
Hellwig  2008;  Hellwig  and  Samuels  2007;  Steiner  2010).  
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zation   on   electoral   politics   are   heterogeneous,   affecting   some  party   families  more   strongly  
than   others   (Burgoon   2012).   For   the   multiparty   systems   that   characterize   most   European  
countries  this  implies  that  some  party  families  are  likely  to  experience  more  pressure  on  the  
demand  side   than  others  or   face  more  difficulties   to   realign   the  policy  preferences  of   their  
constituencies  with   the   demands   of   special   interests   and   global   pressures   emanating   from  
general  trends  of  globalization.  More  generally,  our  research  adds  to  the  small  but  growing  
research  on  the  effects  of  globalization  on  electoral  politics  (for  an  overview  see  Kayser  2007).  
  
  
2. Offshoring  and  the  Vote  
  
How  does  offshoring  affect  politics?  To  answer  this  question,  we  focus  on  electoral  politics  as  
a  particularly  salient  arena  of  democratic  politics  and  examine  how  offshoring  affects   indi-­‐‑
viduals’   voting   behavior.   Building   on   research   about   the   individual-­‐‑level   consequences   of  
the   increasing  possibilities   to  move   the  production  of  goods  and  services  abroad,  we  show  
that  offshoring  creates  both  winners  and  losers  who  are  likely  to  evaluate  the  consequences  
of   this   form  of   global   economic   integration  quite  differently.  We   then  discuss   the   implica-­‐‑
tions  of  these  distributional  consequences  of  offshoring  on  voting  behavior  and  develop  hy-­‐‑
potheses  about  how  the  effects  of  offshoring  on  vote  choice  differ  among  party  families.  
  
2.1. The  Individual-­‐‑Level  Effects  of  Offshoring:  Risks  and  Opportunities  
  
Offshoring   creates   both   risks   and   opportunities.   On   the   negative   side,   offshoring   poses   a  
substantial  threat  to  workers  whose  jobs  have  the  potential  to  be  substituted  by  jobs  abroad.  
These  workers  not  only  face  the  risk  of   losing  their   jobs  altogether,  but  also  see  themselves  
exposed  to  downward  pressure  on  their  wages,  even  if  their   jobs  are  not  actually  offshored  
(Grossman  and  Rossi-­‐‑Hansberg  2008).  As  both  employment  and  wages  become  more  vola-­‐‑
tile,  workers  exposed  to  offshoring  are  therefore  likely  to  experience  a  higher  level  of   labor  
market  risk   (Scheve  and  Slaughter  2004;  Walter  2010).  Typically,   the   jobs  most  at  risk  from  
offshoring  have  been  routine   jobs  that  can  easily  be  provided  from  anywhere  in  the  world.  
Low-­‐‑skilled   individuals   with   potentially   offshorable   jobs   tend   to   be   most   exposed   to   the  
negative  consequences  of  offshoring,  because  their  jobs  are  most  likely  to  be  moved  abroad,  
because  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  for  these  workers  to  find  a  new  job  in  the  same  oc-­‐‑
cupation   if   most   firms   engage   in   similar   offshoring   activities,   and   because   offshoring   de-­‐‑
presses  wages  for  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals  (Feenstra  and  Hanson  1999;  Hummels  et  al.  2014;  
Walter  2014).  
On   the   positive   side,   offshoring   enhances   the   profitability   of   firms   and   therefore   benefits  
owners,  shareholders,  and  most  importantly  those  employees  who  continue  working  in  the  
home  location,  especially  since  new  foreign  activities  often  also  enhance  domestic  activities  
in  other  parts  of   the   firm,   such  as   research,  marketing,  or  distribution   (Amiti   and  Konings  
2007;   Kasahara   and  Rodrigue   2008).  Moreover,   although   the   phenomenon   of   offshoring   is  
often  thought  of  in  terms  of  the  migration  of  jobs  from  rich  countries  to  poor  countries,  indi-­‐‑
viduals   in   rich   countries   also   provide   services   for   poor-­‐‑country   firms.   For   example,   some  
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firms  with  headquarters  in  less  developed  economies  have  built  up  technology  research  cen-­‐‑
ters   in  advanced  economies   in  which   they  hire  engineers   to  develop  new  technologies  and  
products.  As  a  result,  individuals  providing  such  services  can  sell  their  skills  to  a  wider  set  of  
potential  employers.  This,  in  turn,  is  likely  to  improve  job  security  and  wages  for  these  indi-­‐‑
viduals  allowing  them  to  benefit  from  the  opportunities  offshoring  creates.  Since  the  precon-­‐‑
dition  in  this  case  is  that  these  individuals  possess  skills  that  are  very  competitive  and  sought  
after   internationally,   the   benefits   of   offshoring   are  more   likely   to   accrue   to  well-­‐‑educated  
individuals.  Not  surprisingly,  therefore,  offshoring  has  been  found  to  increase  the  wages  of  
high-­‐‑skilled  individuals  (Hummels  et  al.  2014).  
At   the  same  time  most   individuals  are  unaffected  by  offshoring.  Even  though  they  may  be  
exposed  to  offshoring  indirectly  as  consumers  –  for  example,  when  calling  a  call  center  that  
turns  out  to  be  located  in  a  foreign  country  –  they  are  not  directly  affected  as   labor  market  
participants.  Many   jobs   simply   cannot   be   offshored,   because   the   services   they   provide   re-­‐‑
quire   them   to   be   on-­‐‑site   (Blinder   2009).   Doctors,   teachers,   hairdressers,   or   bus   drivers   are  
therefore  much  more   sheltered   from   offshoring   than  workers   in   occupations   that   provide  
more  impersonal  services  or  general  manufactured  goods.  
Whereas   existing   studies   on   the   individual-­‐‑level   effects   of   globalization   exposure   (e.g.,  
Margalit  2011;  Rehm  2009;  Scheve  and  Slaughter  2004)  assume  that  globalization  has  a  uni-­‐‑
form  effect  on  all  workers,  this  discussion  suggests  that  this  effect  is  in  fact  conditional  on  an  
individual’s  skill  level.  The  impact  of  offshoring  on  an  individual  worker’s  labor  market  risk  
perception  is  thus  determined  by  two  factors:  First,  the  degree  to  which  the  individual’s  oc-­‐‑
cupation   is   potentially   offshorable   or   not,   and   second,   the   individual’s   skill   level   (see   also  
Walter  2014;  Wren  and  Rehm  2013).  
  
Figure  1:  Conditional  Effect  of  Job  Offshorability  and  Skill-­‐‑Level  on  Labor  Market  Risk  
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Figure  1  summarizes  the  effects  of  offshoring  on  individual   labor  market  risks  across  these  
different  groups  of  workers.   It  shows  that  offshoring  creates   the  highest   labor  market  risks  
for  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals  working  in  offshorable  occupations  (e.g.  assembly-­‐‑line  workers).  
Equally   low-­‐‑skilled   individuals  working   in   sheltered   occupations   (e.g.   cleaning  personnel)  
are   better   off   than   their   counterparts   in   offshorable   occupations,   although   in   today’s  
“knowledge   economy”   they   continue   to   experience   higher   labor   market   risks   than   high-­‐‑
skilled  workers  in  sheltered  occupations  (e.g.  doctors  or  teachers).  Finally,  highly  skilled  in-­‐‑
dividuals  with  offshorable  occupations  (e.g.  engineers  or  business  consultants)  are  the  main  
beneficiaries  of  the  globalization  of  production.2  Overall,  this  suggests  that  the  inequality  in  
labor  market  risks  should  be  much  more  pronounced  among  workers  exposed  to  offshoring  
than  among  workers  in  sheltered  occupations.  
  
2.2. Offshoring  and  Party  Preferences  
  
Since   the   risks   and   opportunities   of   offshoring   are   distributed   unequally   across   different  
groups   of   workers,   we   expect   the   political   responses   to   offshoring   to   vary   among   these  
groups  as  well.  Much  research  has  argued  that   individuals’  exposure   to   labor  market   risks  
translates   into  preferences   for  policies   that   reduce   such   risks   through   encompassing   social  
policies   (Cusack   et   al.   2006;   Iversen   and   Soskice   2001;  Moene   and  Wallerstein   2001;   Rehm  
2009;  Rodrik  1998;  Svallfors  1997;  Walter  2010).  Similarly,   individuals  benefitting   from  cer-­‐‑
tain  economic  developments  are   likely   to  support  policies   that  encourage   these   trends.  For  
example,   individuals   benefitting   from   free   trade   have   been   shown   to   oppose   protectionist  
policies  (e.g.,  Beaulieu  2002;  Hays  et  al.  2005;  Mayda  and  Rodrik  2005;  Scheve  and  Slaughter  
2001)  and   to  oppose  significant   income  redistribution  (Walter  2014;  Wren  and  Rehm  2013).  
This  suggests  that  the  winners  and  losers  from  offshoring  should  equally  differ  with  regard  
to   their   policy   preferences:   Low-­‐‑skilled   individuals   with   offshorable   jobs   should   have   a  
strong  preference  for  protection  from  offshoring  and  financial  compensation   in   the  form  of  
welfare  state  expansion.  In  contrast,  highly  skilled  individuals,  who  benefit  from  offshoring,  
have  a  lower  need  for  a  state-­‐‑funded  social  safety  net  while  simultaneously  being  among  the  
main  contributors  to  the  financing  of  the  welfare  state.  As  a  result,  we  expect  these  individu-­‐‑
als   to   favor   economic   liberalization   and  welfare   state   retrenchment   (or   at   least   no   further  
expansion).  Individuals  sheltered  from  offshoring  should  have  more  moderate  policy  prefer-­‐‑
ences   than  their  more  exposed  counterparts,  with   low-­‐‑skilled   individuals  demanding  more  
protection  than  high-­‐‑skilled  individuals.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  These  conjectures  are  in  line  with  recent  developments  in  trade  theory,  which  imply  that  globaliza-­‐‑
tion  may   increase   inequality  between  high-­‐‑and   low-­‐‑skilled   individuals   (Helpman  et  al.   2010;  Melitz  
2003).   They   also   resonate  with   recent   research   in   comparative  political   economy,  which  has   argued  
that  individual  risk  perceptions  and  policy  preferences  are  shaped  much  more  by  occupational  labor  
market   risks   than   sector-­‐‑specific   risks,   because   costly   investments   in   training   and   specialization   in  
specific  skills  typically  make  it  much  more  difficult  for  individuals  to  change  their  occupation  than  to  
change   their   industry   of   employment   (Cusack   et   al.   2006;   Iversen   and   Soskice   2001;   Rehm   2009;  
Schwander  and  Häusermann  2013).  
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Of  course,  policy  preferences  can  only  have  an  actual  political  impact  if  they  are  brought  into  
the  political  arena.  In  democratic  countries,  the  most  straightforward  strategy  for  communi-­‐‑
cating  individual  policy  preferences  in  a  politically  influential  manner  is  to  support  and  vote  
for   those  political  parties  most   likely   to  advocate   their   issues   in   the  political  arena.  A   large  
body  of  research  has  shown  that  political  parties  vary  with  regard  to  the  policies  they  cham-­‐‑
pion  in  response  to  globalization  (Adams  et  al.  2009;  Boix  1998;  Burgoon  2012;  Garrett  1998;  
Haupt   2010;   Kriesi   et   al.   2006).3  We   therefore   expect   that   offshoring   systematically   affects  
partisan  preferences  as  well  and  that  high-­‐‑  and  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals  exposed  to  offshoring  
should  favor  different  types  of  political  parties.  We  expect  the  most  pronounced  difference  in  
partisan  preferences  for  parties  located  at  the  two  ends  of  the  state-­‐‑market-­‐‑divide  of  partisan  
competition,  because  these  parties  traditionally  advocate  policies  that  are  of  particular  rele-­‐‑
vance   for   either   the   losers   or   the   winners   of   the   offshoring   trend.   In   contrast,   offshoring  
should  have  less  of  an  effect  on  center  and  no  effect  on  right-­‐‑wing  and  green  parties.  
  
Left  parties  should  be  particularly  attractive  for  low-­‐‑skilled  workers  threatened  by  offshor-­‐‑
ing  because  they  advocate  welfare  state  expansion,  income  redistribution  from  the  rich  to  the  
poor,  and  other  policies  that  protect  vulnerable  workers  from  labor  market  risks  (Benoit  and  
Laver   2006;   Schmidt   2010).   For   example,   social  democratic   and   socialist   governments  have  
been  found  to  engage  in  more  social  spending  (Hicks  and  Swank  1992;  Schmidt  1996)  and  to  
offer   more   generous   social   insurance   benefits   (Allan   and   Scruggs   2004;   Korpi   and   Palme  
2003).  As  a  result,  workers  with  lower  incomes  and  higher  labor  market  risks  have  been  con-­‐‑
sistently  found  to  be  among  the  main  constituency  of  these  parties.4  Offshoring  raises  labor  
market   risks  and  depresses  wages   for   low-­‐‑skilled  workers.  We   therefore  expect   these   indi-­‐‑
viduals   to  exhibit  a  higher  propensity  to  vote  for  welfare-­‐‑state  parties   than  other  voters.   In  
contrast,  since  left  parties  advocate  higher  taxes  and  income  redistribution,  which  may  also  
reduce   international   competitiveness   (Alesina  and  Perotti   1997),   their  policies   conflict  with  
the  material  interest  of  individuals  benefitted  by  offshoring.  Consequently,  we  expect  high-­‐‑
skilled  individuals  in  offshorable  occupations  to  be  least  likely  to  vote  for  these  parties.  Alt-­‐‑
hough  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals  should  consistently  exhibit  a  higher  propensity  to  vote  for  left  
parties  than  high-­‐‑skilled  individuals,  we  expect  that  this  difference  between  high-­‐‑  and  low-­‐‑
skilled  individuals  should  become  much  more  pronounced  when  individuals  work  in  occu-­‐‑
pations  with  a  high  offshoring  potential.  
  
In   contrast,   we   expect   that   high-­‐‑skilled   workers   in   offshorable   occupations   prefer   liberal  
parties.  Although  the  parties  in  this  category  may  differ  with  regard  to  their  position  on  oth-­‐‑
er  policy  dimensions,  they  share  common  grounds  with  regard  to  economic  and  social  poli-­‐‑
cies.  Liberal  parties   tend   to  be  skeptical  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  government   intervention   in   the  economy,  
actively  advocate  free  market  policies  including  a  further  opening  of  the  economy,  and  pro-­‐‑
mote  lower  levels  of  taxation  (Benoit  and  Laver  2006;  Schmidt  2010).  Not  surprisingly,  liberal  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Note   that  other   researchers  argue   that  globalization  constrains  governments’   room  to  maneuver   in  
economic   policymaking   (e.g.,   Hellwig   2007;   Ross   2000;   Steiner   and  Martin   2012).   If   this   argument  
holds,  offshorability  should  not  influence  voting  behavior.  
4  This  is  particularly  true  for  labor  market  insiders  (Rueda  2005).  
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governments  have  been  found  to  be  associated  with  to  lower  social  spending  and  a  less  gen-­‐‑
erous   provision   of   social   rights   (Allan   and   Scruggs   2004;  Hicks   and   Swank   1992;   Schmidt  
1996).   These   parties   therefore   especially   appeal   to   high-­‐‑skilled   individuals   in   offshorable  
occupations.  Not  only  do  these  individuals  know  that  they  will  in  all  likelihood  be  net  payers  
into   the  welfare   system,   because   they   are   voters  with   high   incomes   and   low   labor-­‐‑market  
risks,   but   they   are   also   likely   to   suffer   from   the   competitiveness-­‐‑reducing   effect   of   a   large  
welfare  state  (Wren  and  Rehm  2013).  In  contrast,  low-­‐‑skilled  voters,  especially  those  in  high-­‐‑
ly  offshorable  occupations,   should  exhibit  a  much   lower  propensity   to  vote   for   liberal  par-­‐‑
ties.   As   before,  we   expect   the   difference   in   the   voting   propensity   for   liberal   parties   to   in-­‐‑
crease  the  more  exposed  individuals  are  to  offshoring.  
  
We  expect  offshorability  to  also  play  a  role  for  centrist  parties  –  conservative  and  Christian  
democratic  –  although  to  a  smaller  degree  than  for  liberal  parties.  These  parties  tend  to  ad-­‐‑
vocate  policies  that  can  be  located  somewhat  to  the  right  of  the  center  of  the  left-­‐‑right  dimen-­‐‑
sion.  They  typically  promote  some  free  market  policies  embedded  in  a  resilient  welfare  state  
system  (Schmidt  2010).  Overall,  they  are,  hence,  more  likely  to  appeal  to  the  beneficiaries  of  
offshoring  than  to  the  losers  so  that  we  expect  effects  similar  to  liberal  parties.  
  
In  contrast  to  these  three  party  families,  we  do  not  expect  offshoring  to  be  an  important  issue  
for  right-­‐‑wing  or  green  parties.  The  effect  of  offshorability  on  partisan  preferences  for  right-­‐‑
wing  parties   is   theoretically  ambiguous.  Right-­‐‑wing  populist  parties  are  by  no  means  pro-­‐‑
ponents   of   welfare   state   retrenchment.   Rather,   they   favor   protectionist   trade   policies   and  
social  protection  that  benefits  nationals  only  (Schmidt  2010).  For  this  reason,  previous  studies  
have  argued  that  right-­‐‑wing  populist  parties  particularly  appeal  to  modernization  and  glob-­‐‑
alization   losers   (Betz  1993;  Kriesi   et  al.   2006;  Spies  2013).  At   the   same   time,   it   is   likely   that  
right-­‐‑wing  parties   appeal   to   low-­‐‑skilled  workers   across   the   board,   especially   because   low-­‐‑
skilled  workers  who   are   sheltered   from   offshoring   pressures   face   alternative   labor  market  
risks   in   the   form   of   labor   market   competition   by   low-­‐‑skilled   immigrants   and   are,   hence,  
equally   threatened   by   both   the   globalization   of   production   and   the   globalization   of   labor  
(Burgoon  et  al.  2012;  Dancygier  and  Walter  forthcoming).  This  implies  that  low-­‐‑skilled  indi-­‐‑
viduals  should  in  general  be  more  likely  to  vote  for  rightist  parties  than  high-­‐‑skilled  individ-­‐‑
uals,  with  no  additional  effect  of  offshoring.  High-­‐‑skilled  voters  are  expected  to  be  much  less  
likely   to   vote   for   rightist   parties   across   the   board.  Although   those   in   offshorable  positions  
should  oppose  these  parties  for  material  reasons  because  they  benefit  from  free  market  poli-­‐‑
cies  and  immigration,  those  in  sheltered  occupations  tend  to  be  socio-­‐‑cultural  professionals  
who  tend  to  be  opposed  to  these  parties  on  ideological  grounds  (Oesch  2008).  
  
Green  parties,  in  contrast,  share  an  emphasis  on  environmental  protection  and  are  less  con-­‐‑
cerned  about  and  less  homogenous  with  regard  to  questions  regarding  the  welfare  state  and  
free  market  policies  (Benoit  and  Laver  2006).  As  “the”  post-­‐‑material  party  family,  we  expect  
the  material   interests   of   individuals   affected   by   offshoring   to   play   a   negligible   role   in   ex-­‐‑
plaining  partisan  preferences  for  green  parties.  But  we  expect  high-­‐‑skilled  individuals  across  
the  board  to  be  more  likely  to  vote  for  these  parties  than  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals.  
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Table  1:  Expected  Effect  of  Offshorability  on  Party  Preferences,  Conditional  on  Skill-­‐‑Level  
  
  
Left   Liberal   Center   Right-­‐‑Wing   Green  
Low-­‐‑skilled  individuals   +  +   –  –   –   0   0  
High-­‐‑skilled  individual   –  –   +  +   +   0   0  
  
Table  1  summarizes  our  expectations  about  the  effect  of  offshoring  on  partisan  preferences.  
We  expect  the  increasing  prevalence  of  offshoring  to  have  noticeable  effects  on  party  politics  
for  some  political  parties,  but  not  for  others.  The  effects  should  be  strongest  for  left  and  liber-­‐‑
al  parties,  because   these  parties   can  easily  be  differentiated  with   regard   to   their   social   and  
economic  policy  positions.  They  therefore  serve  as  natural  agents  for   losers  and  winners  of  
the  offshoring  trend  by  advocating  policies  that  cater  to  their  specific   interests.  Low-­‐‑skilled  
(high-­‐‑skilled)  individuals  in  offshorable  occupations  are  therefore  expected  to  be  most  (least)  
likely   to  vote   for   left  parties   and   least   (most)   likely   to  vote   for   liberal  parties.  We  expect   a  
weaker  effect  similar  to  the  one  for  liberal  parties  for  centrist  parties  and  no  effect  for  right-­‐‑
wing  and  green  parties.  All   in  all,   rather   than  a  simple  backlash  against   incumbent  policy-­‐‑
makers   (Margalit   2011),  we  expect  more  definable  partisan  effects  of  globalization-­‐‑induced  
risks  and  opportunities.  The  remainder  of  this  paper  tests  these  predictions.  
  
  
3. Research  Design  
  
To  test  our  argument  about  how  offshoring  affects   individual  voting  behavior,  we  use  sur-­‐‑
vey   data   from   five   consecutive  waves   of   the   European   Social   Survey   (ESS)   conducted   be-­‐‑
tween  2002  and  2010  in  25  European  countries.5  This  set  of  countries  is  especially  useful,  be-­‐‑
cause   it   represents   developed   capitalist   democracies  with   established  multi-­‐‑party   systems,  
which  allows  us  to  test  our  argument  about  differentiated  partisan  effects  beyond  the  litera-­‐‑
ture’s  traditional  focus  on  left  or  conservative  parties  only  (e.g.,  Burgoon  2012;  Walter  2010).  
We  focus  on  working-­‐‑age  respondents  since  globalization-­‐‑induced  labor  market  risks  should  
be  most  prevalent  concerning  this  section  of  the  population.6  
  
3.1. Dependent  Variable:  Individual  Party  Preferences  
  
We  measure   individual   partisan  preferences   by   coding   their   preference   for   different   party  
families.  The  variable  is  based  on  a  survey  question  that  asks  respondents  which  party  they  
voted   for   in   the   last   election.7  For   robustness,   we   additionally   use   information   about   re-­‐‑	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Austria,  Belgium,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  
Iceland,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Poland,  Portugal,  Slovak  Republic,  
Slovenia,   Spain,   Sweden,   Switzerland,   and   the   United   Kingdom.   Table   A1   summarizes   the   survey  
coverage  for  each  country  and  ESS  round.  
6  Results  are  robust  to  including  retirees.  
7  Table  A2  in  the  appendix  provides  detailed  information  about  the  operationalization  of  all  variables  
and  descriptive  statistics.  
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spondents’   current   closeness   to   a   political   party   (“Is   there   a   particular   political   party   you   feel  
closer  to  than  all  the  other  parties?”).  Since  the  answer  categories  for  both  questions  list  the  re-­‐‑
spective  national,  we   categorize   all  parties   into   cross-­‐‑nationally   comparable  party   families,  
distinguishing  between  the  five  different  party  families  discussed  above:8  left,   liberal,  right-­‐‑
wing,  center9,  and  green  parties.  We  then  empirically  identify  the  party  family  of  each  politi-­‐‑
cal  party   in  each  country  covered  in  each  round  by  the  ESS  based  on  the  dataset  about  the  
composition  of  governments  in  OECD-­‐‑countries  by  Schmidt  (2012)  and  the  Manifesto  Project  
Database   (Volkens   et   al.   2013)   and   create   five   dummy   variables   recording   whether   a   re-­‐‑
spondent  voted  for  or  feels  close  to  each  party  family.10  We  proceed  as  follows:  First,  we  clas-­‐‑
sify  the  party  family  of   the  respondent’s  vote  choice  separately  for  both  databases.  Second,  
we  merge   these  classifications   in  accordance  with   the   following  rules:   If  both  databases  re-­‐‑
port  the  same  party  family  for  a  single  party,  we  classify  the  latter  accordingly.  If  one  data-­‐‑
base  codes  a  party  as  a  member  of  one  of  our  five  party  families  and  the  other  database  codes  
it  as  a  residual  party  family  or  provides  no  information,  we  classify  the  party  in  line  with  the  
information-­‐‑providing  database.  If  both  databases  provide  no  information  at  all,  we  code  the  
party  as  missing.  If  the  two  databases  disagree  about  the  specific  party  family,  we  gathered  
more  data  (e.g.  the  membership  of  a  party  in  a  political  group  in  the  European  Parliament)  to  
classify  this  party  accurately.  This  adjustment  is  the  case  in  about  2  percent  of  all  answers.11  
  
3.2. Independent  Variables:  Exposure  to  Offshoring  and  Skill-­‐‑Level  
  
Our  argument  suggests   that  offshoring  affects   individual  partisan  preferences,  but   that   the  
effect  differs  between  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals,  for  whom  the  risks  of  offshoring  outweigh  the  
benefits,  and  high-­‐‑skilled   individuals,   for  whom  offshoring  predominantly  opens  new  per-­‐‑
spectives  and  opportunities.  These  considerations  suggest   three  key   independent  variables:  
One   variable   measuring   respondents’   exposure   to   offshoring,   one   measuring   individuals’  
skill-­‐‑level,   and   lastly,   an   interaction   term   between   these   variables,   in   order   to   address   the  
conditional  effect  of  both.  
  
Exposure  to  Offshoring.  As  discussed  above,  not  all  workers  are  equally  exposed  to  the  off-­‐‑
shoring  trend  that  has  affected  most  advanced  economies.  Rather,  jobs  differ  with  regard  to  
the  degree   to  which   they  can  be  offshored,   i.e.,   substituted  by   jobs  abroad.  To  measure   re-­‐‑
spondents’   occupational   offshorability,  we   use   information   about   respondents’   occupation  
contained  in  the  ESS  in  the  form  of  ISCO-­‐‑codes  and  match  these  with  information  from  the  
offshorability-­‐‑index  developed  by  Blinder  (2009).  This  ordinal  index  measures  a  job’s  poten-­‐‑
tial  to  be  moved  abroad,  i.e.  whether  the  service  the  job  provides  can  theoretically  be  deliv-­‐‑
ered  over   long  distances  with   little  or  no  degradation  in  quality  for  more  than  800  occupa-­‐‑	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Table   A3   provides   information   concerning   the   categorization   of   both   classifications.   Parties   that  
could  not  be  attributed  to  one  of  these  five  party  families  are  included  in  a  residual  category.  
9  Results  are  robust  to  analyzing  Christian  democratic  and  conservative  parties  as  separately.  
10  Figure  A1  in  the  appendix  shows  the  distribution  of  party  preferences  for  each  of  the  25  countries.  
11  Because   right-­‐‑wing   populist   parties   are   small   in  most   countries,   we   additionally   cross-­‐‑check   our  
classification  with  the  list  of  right-­‐‑wing  populist  parties  provided  by  Mudde  (2007).  
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tional   categories.12  Blinder   ranks  each  occupation’s  offshorability  potential  on  an  ordinal  4-­‐‑
point  scale  ranging  from  no  offshoring-­‐‑potential  to  high  offshoring  potential  according  to  the  
following  criteria:  If  workers  are  required  to  be  at  a  specific  work  location  in  their  country  in  
order  to  perform  their  task,  they  are  considered  to  have  a  highly  non-­‐‑offshorable  occupation  
(category  1).  If  the  criterion  of  workplace-­‐‑specificity  is  not  fulfilled,  the  second  criterion  de-­‐‑
termines  whether  a  worker  has  to  be  physically  close  to  his  or  her  work  unit.  If  not,  the  oc-­‐‑
cupation  falls  into  the  category  of  highly  offshorable  occupations  (category  4).  The  remaining  
occupations  are  then  classified  into  the  two  middle  categories  of  intermediate  offshorability.  
If  the  entire  work  unit  has  to  be  in  the  same  country,  the  occupation  is  coded  as  somewhat  
offshorable  (category  2),  and  as  offshorable  (category  3)  otherwise.  All  professions  not  listed  
by  Blinder  are  coded  as  not  offshorable.  Because  Blinder  cautions  that  these  categories  can-­‐‑
not  necessarily  be  interpreted  as  an  ordinal  scale,  we  construct  a  simple  binary  index  differ-­‐‑
entiating  between  potentially  offshorable   (categories  2,  3,  and  4)  and  non-­‐‑offshorable   (cate-­‐‑
gory  1)  occupations.13    This  measure  of  globalization  exposure  allows  us  to  assess  individual  
exposure  to  offshoring  risks  on  an  occupational  basis.  The  proportion  of  respondents  in  off-­‐‑
shorable  occupations  varies  between  24.7%  in  Estonia  and  47.7%  in  France.14  
  
Skill-­‐‑Level.   The   operationalization   of   individuals’   skill-­‐‑levels   is   based   on   the   respondents’  
educational  background.  We  use   the   total  number  of  years  during  which  a  respondent  has  
been   in   full-­‐‑time   education.   Of   course,   individuals   can   also   dispose   of   skills   acquired  
through   on-­‐‑the-­‐‑job-­‐‑training   and   individuals   with   low   levels   of   education   can   also   deliver  
high-­‐‑quality  work,  but  empirical  research  has  shown  that  higher  educational  achievement  is  
positively  related  to  higher  occupational  skills  and  higher  levels  of  productivity  (Jones  2001;  
Spitz-­‐‑Oener  2006).  Education  years  therefore  serve  as  a  proxy  for  individual  skill-­‐‑levels.  The  
total  number  of  education  years  is  limited  to  25.15  As  a  robustness  check,  we  additionally  use  
information  on   the  highest   level   of   education   a   respondent  has   achieved.  The   answers   are  
standardized   into   the   ISCED-­‐‑classification   of   education   levels.  We   slightly   adapted   the   7-­‐‑
point   ISCED-­‐‑classification   by   combining   several   categories,   in   part   because   of   some   data  
limitations  in  the  ESS  and  in  one  case  because  of  a  highly  asymmetrical  frequency  distribu-­‐‑
tion  (ISCED  categories  3  and  4).  This  leaves  us  with  4  different  categories.16  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  For  detailed  information  on  applying  the  index  to  the  ESS  survey  data  see  Walter  and  Maduz  (2009).  
13  Results  are  robust  to  using  the  ordinal  and  a  metric  measure  of  offshorability,  that  further  differenti-­‐‑
ates   the   offshorability   of   different   occupations   (Blinder   2009).  Unfortunately,   the  metric  measure   is  
less  well  documented.  
14  Figure  A2  in  the  appendix  provides  more  detailed  information  about  the  distribution  of  the  job  off-­‐‑
shorability  potential  by  country.  
15  A  total  amount  of  more  than  25  years  of  education  can  either  be  a  qualification  level  of  post-­‐‑doctoral  
studies  or  a  false  declaration.  In  the  first  case,  one  can  plausibly  assume  that  the  marginal  effect  of  the  
additional  skills  on  productivity  in  this  stage  of  education  is  very  small.  In  the  second  case,  implausi-­‐‑
ble   and  extreme  values   are   eliminated.  Therefore,  higher  values   are   recoded   to   the  maximum  of   25  
years.  Figure  A3  provides  descriptive  information  of  this  variable.  
16  Table  A4  and  figure  A4  in  the  appendix  provide  further  information.  
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Conditional  Effect:  Offshoring  Exposure   x   Skill-­‐‑Level.  To   capture   the   conditional   effect   of  
individual  exposure  to  offshoring  and  how  it  varies  with  an  individual’s  skill-­‐‑level,  we  use  
an   interaction   term  between   the   former  and   the   latter.17  Our  argument  makes   clear  predic-­‐‑
tions  about  the  nature  of  this  interaction  term.  Since  the  offshoring-­‐‑trend  creates  more  labor  
market  risks  for  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals,  this  group  of  voters  should  be  particularly  likely  to  
vote  for  political  parties  that  aim  to  protect  vulnerable  social  groups,  i.e.  left  parties,  whereas  
highly  skilled  individuals  should  prefer  political  parties  that  strive  for  more  economic  open-­‐‑
ness  and  market-­‐‑liberal  policies,  especially  liberal  parties.  For  left  parties,  our  argument  con-­‐‑
sequently  predicts  a  negative  and  statistically  significant  interaction  term,  whereas  it  should  
be  positive  and  statistically  significant   in  the  cases  of   liberal  and,  to  a   lesser  extent,  centrist  
parties.   For   right-­‐‑wing   parties,  we   expect   that   low-­‐‑skilled  workers   should   be   significantly  
more  likely  to  vote  for  these  parties,  but  that  offshorability  does  not  exert  a  statistically  sig-­‐‑
nificant   effect.  Finally,  we  also  do  not   expect  a   statistically   significant  direct  or   conditional  
effect  of  offshorability  for  green  parties.  
  
3.3. Control  Variables  
  
We   consider   a   number   of   variables   that   control   for   alternative   explanations   of   individual  
voting   behavior.  On   the  micro-­‐‑level  we   follow   the   previous   literature   (e.g.,  Margalit   2011;  
Mughan  et  al.  2003;  Mughan  and  Lacy  2002;  Rydgren  2008;  Walter  2010)  and  include  the  re-­‐‑
spondent’s  income,  age,  gender,  whether  he  or  she  is  unemployed,  member  of  a  trade  union,  
self-­‐‑employed,  ever  had  a  work  contract  of  limited  duration,  or  lives  in  an  urban  area.18  The  
respondent’s  income  is  provided  by  the  ESS  through  a  self-­‐‑assessment  and  self-­‐‑classification  
into   one   of   twelve   income   classes.   To  provide   cross-­‐‑national   comparability  we   recode   this  
variable   insofar   as   it   represents   the   deviation   of   the   respondent’s   income-­‐‑class   from   the  
country-­‐‑specific  median   income-­‐‑class.  We   include   age   in   years   and   a   squared   age   term   to  
capture  the  possibility  that  age  has  a  curvilinear  effect.  The  remaining  individual-­‐‑level  varia-­‐‑
bles  are  coded  as  dummy  variables.  
We  also  include  macro-­‐‑level  variables  to  control  for  the  different  national  contexts  in  which  
respondents   took   their   voting   decision.   First   we   include   the   effective   number   of   electoral  
parties   (Bormann  and  Golder  2013)   to  account   for   the  fact   that  party  vote  shares  vary  with  
the  number  of  parties  running   in  an  election.   In  addition,  we   include   two  standard  macro-­‐‑
level   variables   from   the   economic   voting   literature   (e.g.,   Jordahl   2006;   Lewis-­‐‑Beck   and  
Stegmaier   2000)   in   order   to   capture   the   globalization-­‐‑induced   economic   volatility   of   the  
country:  Openness  to  international  trade  and  the  unemployment  rate.  All  these  variables  are  
measured  separately  for  each  country  in  each  ESS  round  and  have,  to  this  effect,  no  variation  
across  individuals  in  a  given  country  at  a  given  point  in  time.  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  For  general  information  how  to  use  and  interpret  interaction  terms,  see  Ai  and  Norton  (2003),  Berry  
et  al.  (2010),  Brambor  et  al.  (2006),  and  Braumoeller  (2004).  
18  Additionally   controlling   for   skill   specificity   (Iversen   and   Soskice   2001;   Rehm   2009)   or   religiosity  
(Arzheimer  and  Carter  2009)  does  not  alter  the  results.  
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3.4. Method  
  
We   perform   our   analyses   on   a   pooled   dataset   containing   roughly   65000   respondents,   25  
countries  and  5  points  in  time.  Our  preferred  model  specifications  are  random  effects  multi-­‐‑
level   probit  models  with   individuals   nested  within   countries   that   estimate   the   conditional  
effect  of  skill-­‐‑level  and  offshoring  exposure  on  respondents’  vote  choice  for  each  type  of  po-­‐‑
litical  party.  The  use  of  this  model  allows  us  to  account  for  the  fact  that  respondents  from  the  
same  country  share  a  common  context  and  are,  thus,  not  necessarily  independent  from  each  
other  (Hox  2010;  Rabe-­‐‑Hesketh  and  Skrondal  2008;  Steenbergen  and  Jones  2002).  The  disad-­‐‑
vantage  of  this  model  choice  is  that  it  does  not  allow  us  to  model  the  choice  between  differ-­‐‑
ent  political  parties  simultaneously.  As  a  robustness  check,  we  therefore  also  use  a  multino-­‐‑
mial  model  with  country  dummies  and  clustered  standard  errors  (Long  and  Freese  2006).  We  
also  conduct  a  series  of  further  robustness  checks  concerning  different  measures  of  skills  and  
offshorability,  restricting  the  sample  size  to  those  individuals  who  are  either  in  paid  work  or  
actively  looking  for  a  job,  using  current  closeness  to  a  political  party  instead  of  voting  behav-­‐‑
ior  as  an  indicator  of  party  preferences,  and  excluding  the  macro-­‐‑level  control  variables.  The  
results  shown  below  are  generally  robust  to  these  changes.  
  
  
4. Empirical  Findings  
  
Does  offshoring  affect  politics  through  a  direct  and  significant  effect  on  individuals’  electoral  
choices?   The   results   presented   in   table   2   indicate   that   job   offshorability   is   associated  with  
changing  voting  behavior  of  individual  voters  and  that  this  effect  is  conditional  on  individu-­‐‑
al   skills.   Voters   seem   to   take   their   material   interests   into   account   when   making   electoral  
choices:   Offshoring   losers,   i.e.   low-­‐‑skilled   individuals   in   offshorable   occupations,   vote   for  
different   political   parties   than   offshoring  winners,   i.e.   high-­‐‑skilled   individuals  with  poten-­‐‑
tially  offshorable   jobs.  But,   this   is  only  the  case  for  parties  that  strongly  advocate  economic  
and   social   policies   targeted   towards   compensating   the   losers   or   benefitting   the  winners   of  
the  offshoring  trend;  i.e.,  left  and  liberal  parties.  The  results  also  suggest  that  the  offshoring  
trend   does   not   affect   all   party   families   equally.   Voting   behavior   for   green   and   right-­‐‑wing  
parties  in  particular  does  not  differ  among  people  in  offshorable  and  sheltered  occupations.  
  
4.1. Offshoring  and  Preferences  for  Left  Parties  
  
Our   argument   suggests   that   left   parties   should   be   particularly   attractive   for   low-­‐‑skilled  
workers  exposed  to  the  risks  associated  with  the  offshoring  of  production,  and  particularly  
unattractive   for  high-­‐‑skilled  workers   in  offshorable  occupations.  The  results  of   the  analysis  
presented   in   table  2   support   these  hypotheses.  As  expected,   low-­‐‑skilled   individuals  are  al-­‐‑
ways  more  likely  to  vote  for  left  parties  than  high-­‐‑skilled  individuals,  a  robust  and  statistical-­‐‑
ly  significant  finding.  And  this  effect  is  highest  for  those  low-­‐‑skilled  workers  in  offshorable  
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occupations.   However,   the   negative   and   statistically   significant   interaction   term   suggests  
that  this  positive  effect  of  offshorability  declines  the  better  educated  an  individual  is.19  
  
Table  2:  Determinants  of  Individual  Party  Preferences  
  
  
Left   Liberal   Center   Right-­‐‑Wing   Green  
Education  in  years   -­‐‑0.008***   0.019***   -­‐‑0.004**   -­‐‑0.062***   0.064***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Offshorability   0.112***   -­‐‑0.033   -­‐‑0.032   0.012   0.049  
   (0.04)   (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.08)   (0.08)  
Education  x  Offshorability   -­‐‑0.010***   0.007*   0.005*   -­‐‑0.005   -­‐‑0.006  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
Income   -­‐‑0.025***   0.037***   0.030***   -­‐‑0.028***   -­‐‑0.038***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Female   0.034***   -­‐‑0.009   -­‐‑0.026**   -­‐‑0.230***   0.212***  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Union  member   0.293***   -­‐‑0.131***   -­‐‑0.214***   -­‐‑0.047**   0.029  
   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Unemployed   0.092***   -­‐‑0.083**   -­‐‑0.105***   0.114***   -­‐‑0.012  
   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.04)   (0.04)  
Self-­‐‑employed   -­‐‑0.308***   0.156***   0.196***   -­‐‑0.060*   -­‐‑0.004  
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.03)  
Outsider   0.014   -­‐‑0.013   -­‐‑0.060***   -­‐‑0.016   0.132***  
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.03)  
Age  in  years   0.018***   -­‐‑0.012***   -­‐‑0.009***   -­‐‑0.003   0.009*  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)  
Age  squared   -­‐‑0.000***   0.000***   0.000***   -­‐‑0.000   -­‐‑0.000***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Urban  area   0.088***   0.026*   -­‐‑0.174***   -­‐‑0.042*   0.239***  
   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Effective  #  of  parties   -­‐‑0.068***   0.092***   -­‐‑0.018   -­‐‑0.003   0.057**  
   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
Trade  openness   -­‐‑0.005***   -­‐‑0.015***   0.005***   0.023***   0.006**  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Unemployment  rate   0.047***   -­‐‑0.031***   -­‐‑0.034***   0.065***   -­‐‑0.018**  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
#  of  respondents   64895   64895   64895   64895   64895  
#  of  countries   25   25   25   25   25  
R2  (McKelvey/Zavoina)   0.108   0.093   0.069   0.215   0.075  
Prob  >  Chi2   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
BIC   80155.97   40583.98   78418.92   21043.48   24999.67  
Log  likelihood   -­‐‑39961.64   -­‐‑20175.65   -­‐‑39093.11   -­‐‑10405.39   -­‐‑12383.49  
Multilevel  probit  estimates  with  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  
Levels  of  statistical  significance:  *  p≤0.10;  **  p≤0.05;  ***  p≤0.01.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Calculating  this  model  without   the   interaction  term  yields   that  offshorability  has  a  direct  negative  
effect   on   left   party  preferences,  which   is   statistically   significant   at   the   10%   level.   But,   including   the  
interaction  term  between  education  years  and  offshorability  improves  the  model  fit  according  to  the  
BIC,  thereby  supporting  our  theoretical  argument.  
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To   facilitate   the   interpretation   of   the   interaction   term,   figure   2   plots   the  marginal   effect   of  
offshorability  on  partisan  preferences   for  a   left  party  at  different   skill   levels.20  At   low  skill-­‐‑
levels  offshorability  has  a  statistically  significant  positive  effect  but  becomes  statistically  in-­‐‑
significant   at   intermediate   levels   of   education   (7   to   13   years).   Offshorability   is   associated  
with   a   lower   likelihood   of   voting   for   left   parties   for   everyone  who   enjoyed  more   than   13  
years  of  full-­‐‑time  education.  To  give  an  impression  about  the  substantial  effect,  we  calculate  
the   first   difference   in   predicted   probabilities   between   high-­‐‑   and   low-­‐‑skilled   respondents21  
separately   for  both  values  of   offshorability  holding  all   other  variables   at   their  median  and  
use   this   information   to   calculate   the   percentage   increase   (or   decrease)   in   the   vote   gap   be-­‐‑
tween  these  groups  (see  table  3).  The  gap  in  predicted  probabilities  of  voting  for  a  left  party  
between  low-­‐‑  and  high-­‐‑skilled  respondents  is  4.31  percentage  points  for  respondents  in  non-­‐‑
offshorable  occupations.  Amounting  to  9.34  percentage  points  for  individuals  in  offshorable  
occupations,  this  vote  gap  more  than  doubles  among  individuals  exposed  to  the  offshoring  
trend.   This   increase   in   the   vote   gap   supports   our   theoretical   expectation   that   the   effect   of  
offshorability  on  left  party  preferences  is  conditional  on  individual  skills.22  
  




The  results  of  the  control  variables  are  broadly  in  line  with  our  expectations.  Women,  union  
members,  unemployed  respondents,  older  people,  and  respondents  living  in  urban  areas  are  
more  likely  to  vote  for  left  parties.  The  aging-­‐‑effect  diminishes  as  suggested  by  the  squared  
term.  In  contrast,  respondents  with  higher  income  and  those  self-­‐‑employed  are  less  likely  to  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  We  interpret  the  effect  of  the  interaction  term  via  marginal  effects  plots  because  the  size  and  statisti-­‐‑
cal  significance  of  all   interaction  terms  are  calculated  at   the  respective  minimums  of  the  constitutive  
terms.  Both  can  vary  when  applying  non-­‐‑linear  models  (Ai  and  Norton  2003).  
21  We  use  5  and  19  education  years  respectively,  because  they  represent  the  5th  and  95th  percentile.  
22  According  to  the  models  reported  in  table  A5,  the  results  are  robust  to  other  specifications.  
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vote  for  left  parties.  In  line  with  arguments  that  left  parties  mainly  implement  policies  bene-­‐‑
fitting   labor   market   insiders   (Rueda   2005),   the   coefficient   for   outsiders   in   not   statistically  
significant.  Not   surprisingly,   a  higher  number  of   effective  parties  on   the  national   level  de-­‐‑
presses  the  vote  share  left  parties  receive.  Since  left  parties  are  present  in  all  25  countries,  a  
higher   number   of   parties   implies  more   alternatives   to   the   traditionally   strong   left   parties.  
Somewhat   surprising   is   the  negative   effect   of   trade   openness.  Unsurprising   is   the  positive  
and  significant  effect  of  the  unemployment  rate.  
  
Table  3:  Vote  Gap  between  Low-­‐‑  and  High-­‐‑Skilled  Individuals  
  
  
Vote  gap  –  
non-­‐‑offshorable  
Vote  gap  –  
offshorable  
Vote  gap  –  
change    
(percentage  points)  
Vote  gap  –  
change  (in  %)  
Left   4.31   9.34   5.03   116.87  
Liberal   -­‐‑3.16   -­‐‑4.63   -­‐‑1.47   46.49  
Center   2.36   -­‐‑0.34   -­‐‑2.70   -­‐‑114.54  
Right-­‐‑Wing   1.94   1.91   -­‐‑0.03   -­‐‑1.51  
Green   -­‐‑1.09   -­‐‑0.90   0.20   -­‐‑18.06  
  
4.2. Offshoring  and  Preferences  for  Liberal  Parties  
  
The  analysis  of  the  determinants  of  the  left  vote  showed  that  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals  exposed  
to  offshoring  risks  are  particularly  likely  to  vote  for  left  parties  as  the  traditional  advocates  of  
welfare   state   expansion  and   redistribution,  whereas  high-­‐‑skilled   individuals   in  offshorable  
jobs   are   least   likely   to   vote   for   these  parties.  Our   argument   suggests   that   this   latter   group  
should  instead  vote  for  liberal  parties  as  advocates  of  free-­‐‑market  policies  and  minimal  gov-­‐‑
ernment   intervention   in   the   economy,  whereas   liberal   parties   should   be   least   attractive   to  
losers  of  offshoring.  Our  results  show  support  for  this  line  of  reasoning:  more  educated  indi-­‐‑
viduals  are  significantly  more   likely  to  vote  for   liberal  parties,  and  this  effect   increases  fur-­‐‑
ther  when  respondents  work  in  potentially  offshorable  occupations.  Somewhat  unexpected-­‐‑
ly,  offshorability  does  not  have  a  direct  effect  on  liberal  party  preferences  among  low  skilled-­‐‑
individuals,  possibly  reflecting   the   fact   that   these  parties  are  unattractive   to   less  privileged  
voters  in  general.  
Figure  3  shows  that  offshorability  increases  the  propensity  to  vote  for  a  liberal  party  for  all  
individuals  with  at  least  twelve  years  of  education.23  This  conditional  effect  is  also  reflected  
in  the  predicted  probabilities.  The  vote  gap  between  low-­‐‑  and  high-­‐‑skilled  respondents  de-­‐‑
creases  by  about  half   from  -­‐‑3.16  percentage  points  among  respondents   in  sheltered  to  -­‐‑4.63  
percentage   points   among   respondents   in   exposed   occupations.24  Furthermore,   we   test   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Interestingly,  offshorability  also  seems  to  have  a  strong  direct  effect  on  preferences  for   liberal  par-­‐‑
ties.  In  models  without  the  interaction  term,  offshorability  is  positive  and  statistically  significant  at  the  
1%  level.  This  could  implicate  that   individuals  who  are  more  exposed  to  globalization  vote  for  mar-­‐‑
ket-­‐‑liberal  parties,  regardless  how  well-­‐‑educated  they  are,  which  is  inconsistent  with  our  hypothesis.  
But  the  BIC  indicates  that  the  interaction  model  fits  the  data  better.  
24  The   results  are  all   in  all   robust   to  various  model   specifications   such  as   including  education   levels  
instead   of   education   years,   substituting   our   binary   offshorability  measure   by  metric   or   ordinal   off-­‐‑
shore  measures,   leaving   out   the  macro-­‐‑level   controls,   or   using   a  multinomial  model   (see   table  A5).  
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difference   in   the   effects   of   offshorability,   skills,   and   the   interaction   term   between   left   and  
liberal  parties  with  the  help  of  a  multinomial  model  (see  table  A6).  Left  parties  constitute  the  
baseline  category;  therefore  all  effects  indicate  differences  from  left  parties.  Regarding  liberal  
parties,   we   observe   a   statistically   significant   positive   effect   of   skills   implying   that   high-­‐‑
skilled  individuals  are  more  likely  to  vote  for  liberal  parties  than  for  left  parties.  Offshorabil-­‐‑
ity  makes  no  difference  in  the  choice  between  liberal  and  left  parties  if  the  skill-­‐‑level  is  low.  
Most  importantly,  the  interaction  term  is  positive  and  statistically  significant.  This  means  in  
substantial  terms:  High-­‐‑skilled  individuals  are  more  likely  to  vote  for  liberal  parties  than  for  
left  parties  if  their  job  is  potentially  offshorable.  The  results  for  the  individual  control  varia-­‐‑
bles  are  in  line  with  our  expectations.  On  the  macro-­‐‑level,  a  higher  number  of  electoral  par-­‐‑
ties  increases  the  likelihood  for  liberal  party  preferences,  because  a  higher  number  of  parties  
increases  the  chances  that  there  is  an  established  liberal  party.  Both  trade  openness  a  unem-­‐‑
ployment  rate  decrease  the  propensity  to  vote  for  liberal  parties  significantly.  
  




Summing  up,  our   findings  support   the  hypothesis   that  high-­‐‑skilled   individuals  exposed   to  
offshoring  prefer   liberal  parties,  which  can  be  expected   to   favor  policies  strengthening  free  
markets   and   international   competition.   Somewhat   less   expected,   offshorability   does   not  
make  much  of  a  difference  for  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals,  who  are  less  likely  to  vote  for  liberal  
parties  across  the  board.  
  
4.3. Offshoring  and  Preferences  for  Center  Parties  
  
For  centrist  parties  we  expect  to  find  similar,  but  possibly  weaker,  effects  of  offshoring  as  for  
liberal   parties.   Although   generally   right-­‐‑of-­‐‑center,   both   conservative   and   Christian   demo-­‐‑	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Results  are  somewhat  less  stable  when  the  sample  is  reduced  to  active  labor  market  participants  only  
or  when  current  closeness  to  liberal  parties  is  used  as  the  dependent  variable.	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cratic  parties  neither   tend   to   strongly  push   for   further   liberalization  measures  nor  propose  
major  cuts   in  compensation  policies.  The  results  support   this  expectation.  Similar   to   liberal  
parties,   offshorability   has   no   effect   on   the   voting  propensity   of   low-­‐‑skilled   individuals   for  
centrist  parties,  but   significantly   increases   this  propensity   for  highly   skilled   individuals.   In  
addition,  the  interaction  term  reaches  statistical  significance,  although  the  confidence  band  of  
the  marginal   effect   in   figure   5   is   quite   broad.25  All   individual-­‐‑level   control   variables   show  
similar  effects  compared  to   liberal  parties,  with   the  exception  of   the  outsider  status.   In   line  
with  (Rueda  2005),  being  a  labor  market  outsider  significantly  reduces  the  likelihood  for  cen-­‐‑
ter  party  preferences.  Results  generally  are  less  robust  to  alternative  specifications  compared  
with   liberal  parties.  Overall,   this   leads  us   to  conclude  that  offshoring  has  a  similar,   though  
less  stable,  effect  on  people’s  preferences   for  center  parties  compared  with  people’s  prefer-­‐‑
ences  for  liberal  parties.  All  in  all,  high-­‐‑skilled  individuals  have  a  higher  propensity  to  vote  
for  center  parties  if  they  are  exposed  to  globalization.  
  




4.4. Offshoring  and  Preferences  for  Right-­‐‑Wing  Parties  
  
In  contrast   to   the   three  party   families  examined  so   far,  we  do  not  expect   systematic  differ-­‐‑
ences  with   respect   to  offshoring  possibilities   for   right-­‐‑wing  parties,  although  we  do  expect  
that  more  education  is  associated  with  a  significantly  lower  propensity  to  vote  for  these  par-­‐‑
ties.  The  results  presented  in  table  2  support  these  expectations.  Skills  are  indeed  negatively  
correlated  with  right-­‐‑wing  partisan  preferences,  a  robust  and  statistically  significant  finding.  
In  contrast,  offshorability  and  the  interaction  term  do  not  reach  statistical  significance.  Figure  
4  shows  that  across  all  skill-­‐‑levels,  offshorability  has  no  consistent  substantive  marginal  ef-­‐‑	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  Nevertheless,  the  BIC  indicates  that  the  interaction  model  fits  the  data  better  than  a  model  without  
the  interaction  term.  
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fect  on  voting  propensities,  even   if   it   turns  statistically  significant  at  higher   levels  of   skills.  
The  vote  gap  between  high-­‐‑  and   low-­‐‑skilled   individuals   is  almost   identical   for   individuals  
working   in  non-­‐‑offshorable  occupations   (1.94  percentage  points)  and   those  working   in  off-­‐‑
shorable  occupations  (1.91  percentage  points).  
  




In  terms  of  control  variables  the  most  interesting  results  are  located  at  the  macro-­‐‑level.  First,  
the   effective   number   of   electoral   parties   does   not   seem   to   affect   the   voting   propensity   for  
right-­‐‑wing  parties.   In  addition,  we  find  that  right-­‐‑wing  parties  seem  to  be  more  popular   in  
countries  with  a  higher  unemployment  rate.  
All   in  all,  our   findings  show  that  offshoring  does  not   increase   the  popularity  of  right-­‐‑wing  
parties,  contrary  to  arguments  that  these  parties  specifically  cater  towards  globalization  los-­‐‑
ers.  However,  considering  that  low-­‐‑skilled  individuals  as  a  group  tend  to  be  losers  of  global-­‐‑
ization  in  more  general  terms  that  comprise  the  globalization  of  production,  labor,  and  cul-­‐‑
ture,  our  findings  support  this  argument.  In  terms  of  the  narrow  effects  of  offshoring,  how-­‐‑
ever,  our  results  suggest  that  losers  as  well  as  winners  of  the  globalization  of  production  turn  
to  left  and  liberal  parties  respectively  instead  of  right-­‐‑wing  parties.  
  
4.5. Offshoring  and  Preferences  for  Green  Parties  
  
As  a  party  family  firmly  focused  on  post-­‐‑material  issues,  we  equally  expect  no  effect  of  off-­‐‑
shorability  on   individual  preferences   for  green  parties.  The  results   reported   in   table  2  sup-­‐‑
port  this  notion.  Offshorability   is  not  associated  in  a  statistically  or  substantially  significant  
manner  with  a  higher  or  lower  propensity  to  vote  for  green  parties  at  almost  any  skill-­‐‑level  
(figure  6),  and  this  result  is  highly  robust.  As  expected,  we  do  find  a  strong  educational  ef-­‐‑
fect:   green  parties   are   especially  popular  with  well-­‐‑educated  voters.   Furthermore,   the  per-­‐‑
centage   change  of   the   first  differences   in   the  vote  gap  between   low-­‐‑  and  high-­‐‑skilled   indi-­‐‑
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viduals  is  with  18%  compared  to  left,  liberal,  and  centrist  parties  rather  small.  All  in  all,  these  
findings   suggest   that  offshoring  does  not  play  a  major   role   in   shaping   individuals’  prefer-­‐‑
ences  towards  green  parties.  
  
  







What  are  the  political  consequences  of  offshoring?  Does  it  affect  electoral  politics  in  a  broad-­‐‑
er  set  of  countries?  And  if  yes,  do  the  consequences  of  offshoring  on  individual  labor  market  
risks  play  an  equally  important  role  for  every  party  family?  Our  paper  has  set  out  to  answer  
these  questions.  Whereas  most  existing  studies  assume  that  globalization  pressures  affect  all  
individuals  in  a  similar  way,  we  build  on  research  in  economics  that  globalization  in  general,  
and  offshoring  in  particular,  creates  both  winners  and  losers.  Whereas  high-­‐‑skilled  workers  
benefit  from  the  opportunities  created  by  the  increasing  possibilities  to  offshore  parts  of  the  
production  chain,  low-­‐‑skilled  workers  are  predominantly  confronted  with  the  risks  associat-­‐‑
ed  with   this  development.  This   leads   to  diverging   effects   of   offshoring  on  partisan  prefer-­‐‑
ences.  Left  parties   are  particularly  attractive   to   low-­‐‑skilled   individuals  working   in  offshor-­‐‑
able  occupations,  because  these  parties  advocate  a  large  welfare  state  and  income  redistribu-­‐‑
tion.  For  offshoring  winners,  in  contrast,  liberal  parties  have  the  highest  appeal,  followed  by  
centrist  parties.  We  also  argue  that  offshoring  does  not  play  a  role  for  all  party  families.  Rad-­‐‑
ical  right-­‐‑wing  parties  and  green  parties  should  not  be  affected  by  this  development.  
We  tested  our  argument  by  examining  the  determinants  of  individual  vote  choices  in  25  Eu-­‐‑
ropean  countries  and  five  waves  between  the  years  2002  and  2010.  Our  analysis  showed  that  
the  offshoring-­‐‑potential  of  an  individual’s  job  has  a  significant  influence  on  vote  choices  for  
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some   individuals   and   some  political  parties.  Most   affected  by   the  offshoring   trend  are   left  
parties,   who   are   particularly   attractive   for   low-­‐‑skilled   workers   in   exposed   occupations,  
whereas   offshorability   reduces   the   voting   propensity   for   left   parties   among   high-­‐‑skilled  
workers,  who  turn  to  liberal  and  centrist  parties  instead.  Partisan  preferences  for  right-­‐‑wing  
and  green  parties,  in  contrast,  are  not  affected  by  voters’  job  offshorability.  
Our  findings  contribute  to  two  ongoing  debates  in  political  science.  One  is  the  debate  about  
the  influence  of  globalization  on  individual  voting  behavior.  Whereas  several  authors  argue  
that   globalization   has   reduced   the   importance   of   economic   issues   on   vote   choice   (Hellwig  
2007,  2008;  Hellwig  and  Samuels  2007),  our  results  suggest  the  contrary,  because  both  global-­‐‑
ization  losers  and  winners  are  quite  aware  of  the  specific  economic  and  social  policy  packag-­‐‑
es   different   parties   offer   and   vote   accordingly.   Our   paper   also   contributes   to   the   debate  
about  the   influence  of  globalization  on  party  competition.  Here,  researchers  have   lamented  
the   lack   of   attention   to   how   the   effects   of   globalization   on   public   opinion   indirectly   affect  
party  competition  (Ward  et  al.  2011)  and  have  emphasized  the  need  for  further  research  on  
globalization’s   impact   on   political   parties,   particularly   on   parties   of   the   center   and   right  
(Adams  et  al.  2009).  
Our  analysis  advances   insights  on  both  counts.   It   shows   that  offshoring  does   indeed  affect  
individual  voting  behavior,  although  its  impact  strongly  varies  across  party  families.  As  ex-­‐‑
pected,  the  globalization  of  production  increases  the  appeal  of  left  parties  to  low-­‐‑skilled  vot-­‐‑
ers,   but   decreases   it   for   high-­‐‑skilled   voters.   Moreover,   it   makes   liberal   and   centrist   party  
more  attractive  to  high-­‐‑skilled  workers.  At  the  same  time,  offshoring  has  no  effect  on  parties  
predominantly  engaged  in  issues  that  are  not  directly  relevant  for  individuals  exposed  to  the  
possibility  to  move  jobs  abroad.  As  such,  offshoring  is  most  relevant  for  the  parties  that  are  
perceived   as   the   traditional   advocates   of   globalization  winners   or   globalization   losers   and  
should,  therefore,  affect  party  competition.  Because  our  analysis  goes  beyond  the  classic  left-­‐‑
right  divide,  our  findings  are  particularly  relevant  for  the  majority  of  countries  characterized  
by  multiparty   systems.   Overall,   our   results   suggest   that   globalization   has   the   potential   to  
constitute  partisan  preferences  and  to  directly  affect  policymaking  in  capitalist  democracies.  
  
     




Table  A1:  Number  of  Respondents  by  Country  and  ESS  Round  
  
Country   Round  1:  2002   Round  2:  2004   Round  3:  2006   Round  4:  2008   Round  5:  2010   Sum  
Austria   2257   2256   2405   0   0   6918  
Belgium   1899   1778   1798   1760   1704   8939  
Czech  Republic   1360   3026   0   2018   2386   8790  
Denmark   1506   1487   1505   1610   1576   7684  
Estonia   0   1989   1517   1661   1793   6960  
Finland   2000   2022   1896   2195   1878   9991  
France   1503   1806   1986   2073   1728   9096  
Germany   2919   2870   2916   2751   3031   14487  
Greece   2566   2406   0   2072   2715   9759  
Hungary   1685   1498   1518   1544   1561   7806  
Iceland   0   579   0   0   0   579  
Ireland   2046   2286   1800   1764   2576   10472  
Israel   2499   0   0   2490   2294   7283  
Italy   1207   1529   0   0   0   2736  
Luxembourg   1552   1635   0   0   0   3187  
Netherlands   2364   1881   1889   1778   1829   9741  
Norway   2036   1760   1750   1549   1548   8643  
Poland   2110   1716   1721   1619   1751   8917  
Portugal   1511   2052   2222   2367   2150   10302  
Slovak  Republic   0   1512   1766   1810   1856   6944  
Slovenia   1519   1442   1476   1286   1403   7126  
Spain   1729   1663   1876   1576   1885   9729  
Sweden   1999   1948   1927   1830   1497   9201  
Switzerland   2040   2141   1804   1819   1506   9310  
United  Kingdom   2052   1897   2394   2352   2422   11117  






Table  A2:  Operationalization  of  Key  Variables  and  Summary  Statistics  
  
   Operationalization      N   Mean   Sd.   Min.   Max.  
                    
Dependent  Variables                    
Left  vote   ESS  question  B14  in  2002  and  B12  in  
2004-­‐‑2010  
   121709   0.37   0.00   0.48   0.00  
Left  closeness   ESS  question  B25b  in  2002  and  B20b  
in  2004-­‐‑2010  
   92429   0.38   0.00   0.49   0.00  
Liberal  vote   ESS  question  B14  in  2002  and  B12  in  
2004-­‐‑2010  
   121709   0.12   0.00   0.33   0.00  
Liberal  closeness   ESS  question  B25b  in  2002  and  B20b  
in  2004-­‐‑2010  
   92429   0.12   0.00   0.32   0.00  
Right-­‐‑wing  vote   ESS  question  B14  in  2002  and  B12  in  
2004-­‐‑2010  
   121709   0.05   0.00   0.21   0.00  
Right-­‐‑wing  closeness   ESS  question  B25b  in  2002  and  B20b  
in  2004-­‐‑2010  
   92429   0.05   0.00   0.21   0.00  
Center  vote   ESS  question  B14  in  2002  and  B12  in  
2004-­‐‑2010  
   121709   0.39   0.00   0.49   0.00  
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Center  closeness  
ESS  question  B25b  in  2002  and  B20b  
in  2004-­‐‑2010      92429   0.37   0.00   0.48   0.00  
Green  vote  
ESS  question  B14  in  2002  and  B12  in  
2004-­‐‑2010      121709   0.05   0.00   0.21   0.00  
Green  closeness  
ESS  question  B25b  in  2002  and  B20b  
in  2004-­‐‑2010      92429   0.06   0.00   0.24   0.00  
                    
Independent  Variables                    
Education  years   ESS  question  F7  in  2002-­‐‑2008  and  
F16  in  2010  
   203226   12.09   4.05   0.00   25.00  
Education  level   ESS  question  F6  in  2002-­‐‑2008  and  
F15  in  2010  
   204456   1.74   0.98   0.00   3.00  
Job  offshorability  
(binary)  
Blinder  (2009),  merged  by  means  of  
ISCO-­‐‑code  
   182069   0.38   0.49   0.00   1.00  
Job  offshorability  
(ordinal)  
Blinder  (2009),  merged  by  means  of  
ISCO-­‐‑code  
   182069   1.76   1.06   1.00   4.00  
Job  offshorability  
(metric)  
Blinder  (2009),  merged  by  means  of  
ISCO-­‐‑code  
   182069   22.82   31.23   0.00   100.00  
                    
Individual-­‐‑Level  Control  Variables                    
Income  
ESS  question  F30  in  2002,  F32  in  
2004-­‐‑2008  and  F41  in  2010      149126   0.02   2.33   -­‐‑8.00   9.00  
Female   ESS  question  F2  in  2002-­‐‑2010      205456   0.53   0.50   0.00   1.00  
Union  member   ESS  question  F8a  in  2002-­‐‑2008  and  
F17a  in  2010  
   204375   0.20   0.40   0.00   1.00  
Unemployed   ESS  question  F8a  in  2002-­‐‑2008  and  
F17a  in  2010  
   205711   0.06   0.24   0.00   1.00  
Self-­‐‑employed   ESS  question  F12  in  2002-­‐‑2008  and  
F21  in  2010  
   205711   0.11   0.31   0.00   1.00  
Outsider  status   ESS  question  F14  in  2002-­‐‑2008  and  
F23  in  2010  
   205711   0.12   0.33   0.00   1.00  
Age  (in  years)   ESS  question  F3  in  2002-­‐‑2010      204778   46.92   18.52   12.00   123.00  
Urban  area  
ESS  question  F5  in  2002-­‐‑2008  and  
F14  in  2010      204968   0.32   0.47   0.00   1.00  
Religious  denomination  
ESS  question  C10  in  2002-­‐‑2004  and  
C18  in  2006-­‐‑2010      119654   1.84   1.31   0.00   7.00  
Working-­‐‑age  respondents  
ESS  question  F8a  in  2002-­‐‑2008  and  
F17a  in  2010      205711   0.76   0.43   0.00   1.00  
Active  labor  market  partici-­‐‑
pants  
ESS  question  F8a  in  2002-­‐‑2008  and  
F17a  in  2010      205711   0.56   0.50   0.00   1.00  
                       
Country-­‐‑Level  Control  Variables  
Effective  #  of  parties  
Bormann  and  Golder  (2013);  effec-­‐‑
tive  number  of  electoral  parties  
(without  other  parties)  
   205711   4.13   1.69   1.98   10.07  
Trade  openness   Heston  et  al.  (2012);  sum  of  imports  
and  exports  in  %  of  GDP  
   205711   99.01   41.72   48.04   274.99  
Unemployment  rate   OECD  (2013);  harmonized  unem-­‐‑
ployment  rate  
   205711   7.74   3.60   2.52   20.06  
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Table  A3:  Party  Family  Classification  
  
Rommel,  Walter,  and  Maduz  
classification   Code  
Schmidt  (2010,  2012)  
classification  
Volkens  et  al.  (2012)  
classification  





Liberal   2   Liberal   Liberal  
Right-­‐‑wing   3   Right   Nationalist  





Green   5   Green   Ecology  












Table  A4:  Education  Level  Classification  
  




Detailed  ESS  classification  
Less  than  lower  secondary   0  and  1   Not  completed  ISCED-­‐‑level;  ISCED  1;  Vocational  ISCED  2c  <  2years  
Lower  secondary  education  completed   2   General/pre-­‐‑vocational  ISCED  2a/2b;  General  ISCED  2a;  Vocational  
ISCED  2a/2b;  Vocational  ISCED  3c  <  2  years  
Upper  secondary  education  completed  
and  post-­‐‑secondary,  non-­‐‑tertiary  educa-­‐‑
tion  completed  
3  and  4   General  ISCED  3  >=  2  years;  General  ISCED  3a/3b;  General  ISCED  
3a;  Vocational  ISCED  3c  >=  2  years;  Vocational  ISCED  3a/3b;  Voca-­‐‑
tional  ISCED  3a;  General  ISCED  4a/4b;  General  ISCED  4a;  Other  
ISCED  4  programs;  Vocational  ISCED  4a/4b;  Vocational  ISCED  4a  
Tertiary  education  completed   5  and  6   ISCED  5a  short;  ISCED  5b  short;  ISCED  5a  medium,  lower  tertiary;  
ISCED  5a  medium,  upper  tertiary;  ISCED  5a  long,  lower  tertiary;  
ISCED  5a  long,  upper  tertiary;  ISCED  6,  doctoral  degree  
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Table  A5:  Determinants  of  Party  Preferences  –  Robustness  Checks  
  
   Left  Parties   Liberal  Parties  
  
Last  vote   Last  vote   Closeness   Last  vote   Last  vote   Closeness  
Education  in  years   -­‐‑0.010***      -­‐‑0.012***   0.019***      0.021***  
   (0.00)      (0.00)   (0.00)      (0.00)  
Education  in  levels      -­‐‑0.075***         0.108***     
      (0.01)         (0.01)     
Offshorability   0.078*   0.037   0.085*   0.015   -­‐‑0.046   -­‐‑0.024  
   (0.05)   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.06)   (0.04)   (0.08)  
Education  x  Offshorability   -­‐‑0.008**   -­‐‑0.027**   -­‐‑0.008**   0.004   0.046**   0.007  
   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.02)   (0.01)  
Income   -­‐‑0.023***   -­‐‑0.021***   -­‐‑0.027***   0.035***   0.034***   0.045***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Female   0.050***   0.038***   0.054***   0.002   -­‐‑0.011   -­‐‑0.073***  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.02)  
Union  member   0.300***   0.298***   0.367***   -­‐‑0.143***   -­‐‑0.134***   -­‐‑0.136***  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Unemployed   0.104***   0.088***   0.111***   -­‐‑0.077*   -­‐‑0.077**   -­‐‑0.116**  
   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.03)   (0.05)  
Self-­‐‑employed   -­‐‑0.324***   -­‐‑0.308***   -­‐‑0.370***   0.159***   0.155***   0.171***  
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
Outsider   0.009   0.011   0.028   0.008   -­‐‑0.008   -­‐‑0.046  
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
Age  in  years   0.020***   0.018***   0.025***   -­‐‑0.016***   -­‐‑0.013***   -­‐‑0.024***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Age  squared   -­‐‑0.000***   -­‐‑0.000***   -­‐‑0.000***   0.000***   0.000***   0.000***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Urban  area   0.084***   0.090***   0.093***   0.023   0.026*   0.026  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Effective  #  of  parties   -­‐‑0.064***   -­‐‑0.068***   -­‐‑0.056***   0.088***   0.091***   0.161***  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Trade  openness   -­‐‑0.005***   -­‐‑0.005***   -­‐‑0.003***   -­‐‑0.017***   -­‐‑0.015***   -­‐‑0.018***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Unemployment  rate   0.046***   0.047***   0.020***   -­‐‑0.033***   -­‐‑0.031***   -­‐‑0.014**  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)  
#  of  respondents   54929   64688   39003   54929   64688   39003  
#  of  countries   25   25   25   25   25   25  
R2  (McKelvey/Zavoina)   0.107   0.114   0.078   0.105   0.092   0.118  
Prob  >  Chi2   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
BIC   67685.22   79803.47   48559.45   34888.00   40380.11   23595.12  
Log  likelihood   -­‐‑33728.02   -­‐‑39785.42   -­‐‑24168.72   -­‐‑17329.40   -­‐‑20073.74   -­‐‑11686.56  
Multilevel  probit  estimates  with  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  
Levels  of  statistical  significance:  *  p≤0.10;  **  p≤0.05;  ***  p≤0.01.  
Note:  In  the  first  model  the  sample  is  restricted  to  active  labor  market  participants  instead  of  all  working-­‐‑age  respondents.  In  the  
second  model  we  use  education  levels  instead  of  education  years.  In  the  third  model  the  dependent  variable  is  current  closeness  
to  a  political  party  instead  of  the  voting  decision  in  the  last  election.  
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Table  A5:  Determinants  of  Party  Preferences  –  Robustness  Checks  
  
   Center  Parties   Right-­‐‑Wing  Parties  
  
Last  vote   Last  vote   Closeness   Last  vote   Last  vote   Closeness  
Education  in  years   -­‐‑0.003      -­‐‑0.007***   -­‐‑0.061***      -­‐‑0.069***  
   (0.00)      (0.00)   (0.00)      (0.00)  
Education  in  levels      0.031***         -­‐‑0.255***     
      (0.01)         (0.02)     
Offshorability   -­‐‑0.047   0.021   -­‐‑0.037   0.091   0.021   -­‐‑0.202**  
   (0.05)   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.09)   (0.05)   (0.10)  
Education  x  Offshorability   0.006*   0.005   0.006   -­‐‑0.012*   -­‐‑0.036   0.010  
   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.03)   (0.01)  
Income   0.027***   0.026***   0.037***   -­‐‑0.028***   -­‐‑0.027***   -­‐‑0.037***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.01)  
Female   -­‐‑0.045***   -­‐‑0.030***   -­‐‑0.045***   -­‐‑0.252***   -­‐‑0.226***   -­‐‑0.295***  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
Union  member   -­‐‑0.220***   -­‐‑0.221***   -­‐‑0.281***   -­‐‑0.026   -­‐‑0.050**   -­‐‑0.096***  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
Unemployed   -­‐‑0.132***   -­‐‑0.098***   -­‐‑0.150***   0.107**   0.108***   0.068  
   (0.03)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.05)  
Self-­‐‑employed   0.205***   0.193***   0.234***   -­‐‑0.042   -­‐‑0.059*   -­‐‑0.087**  
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.04)  
Outsider   -­‐‑0.061***   -­‐‑0.063***   -­‐‑0.084***   0.005   -­‐‑0.029   -­‐‑0.049  
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.04)  
Age  in  years   -­‐‑0.010***   -­‐‑0.010***   -­‐‑0.015***   -­‐‑0.009   -­‐‑0.003   -­‐‑0.000  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.01)  
Age  squared   0.000***   0.000***   0.000***   0.000   -­‐‑0.000   -­‐‑0.000  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Urban  area   -­‐‑0.174***   -­‐‑0.183***   -­‐‑0.188***   -­‐‑0.022   -­‐‑0.054**   -­‐‑0.058**  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
Effective  #  of  parties   -­‐‑0.021   -­‐‑0.019*   -­‐‑0.056***   -­‐‑0.004   -­‐‑0.002   0.048*  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
Trade  openness   0.005***   0.005***   0.003**   0.020***   0.023***   0.019***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Unemployment  rate   -­‐‑0.034***   -­‐‑0.034***   -­‐‑0.024***   0.067***   0.068***   0.085***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
#  of  respondents   54929   64688   39003   54929   64688   39003  
#  of  countries   25   25   25   25   25   25  
R2  (McKelvey/Zavoina)   0.070   0.072   0.059   0.199   0.209   0.208  
Prob  >  Chi2   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
BIC   66453.36   78144.07   46281.37   17643.44   21049.21   11990.85  
Log  likelihood   -­‐‑33112.09   -­‐‑38955.72   -­‐‑23029.69   -­‐‑8707.13   -­‐‑10408.29   -­‐‑5884.43  
Multilevel  probit  estimates  with  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  
Levels  of  statistical  significance:  *  p≤0.10;  **  p≤0.05;  ***  p≤0.01.  
Note:  In  the  first  model  the  sample  is  restricted  to  active  labor  market  participants  instead  of  all  working-­‐‑age  respondents.  In  the  
second  model  we  use  education  levels  instead  of  education  years.  In  the  third  model  the  dependent  variable  is  current  closeness  
to  a  political  party  instead  of  the  voting  decision  in  the  last  election.  
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Table  A5:  Determinants  of  Party  Preferences  –  Robustness  Checks  
  
   Green  Parties  
  
Last  vote   Last  vote   Closeness  
Education  in  years   0.066***      0.070***  
   (0.00)      (0.00)  
Education  in  levels      0.279***     
      (0.02)     
Offshorability   0.085   0.040   0.135  
   (0.08)   (0.06)   (0.09)  
Education  x  Offshorability   -­‐‑0.009   -­‐‑0.039   -­‐‑0.012**  
   (0.01)   (0.03)   (0.01)  
Income   -­‐‑0.037***   -­‐‑0.038***   -­‐‑0.044***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.01)  
Female   0.220***   0.201***   0.301***  
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Union  member   0.034   0.025   -­‐‑0.010  
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
Unemployed   -­‐‑0.029   -­‐‑0.016   0.027  
   (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.05)  
Self-­‐‑employed   -­‐‑0.015   0.005   0.048  
   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)  
Outsider   0.119***   0.161***   0.179***  
   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)  
Age  in  years   0.020***   0.011**   0.019***  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
Age  squared   -­‐‑0.000***   -­‐‑0.000***   -­‐‑0.000***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Urban  area   0.249***   0.265***   0.217***  
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Effective  #  of  parties   0.042   0.058**   0.053*  
   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)  
Trade  openness   0.007***   0.006**   0.010***  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Unemployment  rate   -­‐‑0.021**   -­‐‑0.013   -­‐‑0.021**  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
#  of  respondents   54929   64688   39003  
#  of  countries   25   25   25  
R2  (McKelvey/Zavoina)   0.092   0.083   0.126  
Prob  >  Chi2   0.000   0.000   0.000  
BIC   21101.56   25102.73   17747.90  
Log  likelihood   -­‐‑10436.19   -­‐‑12435.05   -­‐‑8762.95  
Multilevel  probit  estimates  with  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  
Levels  of  statistical  significance:  *  p≤0.10;  **  p≤0.05;  ***  p≤0.01.  
Note:  In  the  first  model  the  sample  is  restricted  to  active  labor  market  partic-­‐‑
ipants   instead  of  all  working-­‐‑age  respondents.   In   the  second  model  we  use  
education  levels  instead  of  education  years.  In  the  third  model  the  depend-­‐‑
ent   variable   is   current   closeness   to   a   political   party   instead   of   the   voting  
decision  in  the  last  election.  
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Table  A6:  Determinants  of  Party  Preferences  –  Multinomial  Model  
  
  
Left   Liberal   Center   Right-­‐‑Wing   Green  
Education  in  years      0.037***   0.005   -­‐‑0.115***   0.123***  
      (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Offshorability      -­‐‑0.218   -­‐‑0.160   -­‐‑0.225   -­‐‑0.147  
      (0.15)   (0.12)   (0.14)   (0.17)  
Education  x  Offshorability      0.024**   0.016*   0.010   0.007  











0.086***   0.060***   -­‐‑0.018   -­‐‑0.031***  
   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)  
Female   -­‐‑0.049   -­‐‑0.061*   -­‐‑0.480***   0.359***  
   (0.07)   (0.03)   (0.06)   (0.04)  
Union  member   -­‐‑0.503***   -­‐‑0.533***   -­‐‑0.380***   -­‐‑0.260***  
   (0.07)   (0.07)   (0.12)   (0.09)  
Unemployed   -­‐‑0.226**   -­‐‑0.200***   0.119   -­‐‑0.101  
   (0.09)   (0.07)   (0.12)   (0.11)  
Self-­‐‑employed   0.588***   0.529***   0.221**   0.372***  
   (0.11)   (0.09)   (0.11)   (0.09)  
Outsider   -­‐‑0.048   -­‐‑0.081*   -­‐‑0.101**   0.183**  
   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.05)   (0.08)  
Age  in  years   -­‐‑0.046***   -­‐‑0.031***   -­‐‑0.062***   -­‐‑0.024*  
   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)  
Age  squared   0.000***   0.000***   0.000*   0.000  
   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  
Urban  area   -­‐‑0.033   -­‐‑0.275***   -­‐‑0.186***   0.337***  
   (0.08)   (0.08)   (0.07)   (0.07)  
Effective  #  of  parties      0.212   0.060   0.009   0.125  
      (0.14)   (0.09)   (0.25)   (0.15)  
Trade  openness      -­‐‑0.033***   0.011**   0.018   -­‐‑0.017**  
      (0.01)   (0.00)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
Unemployment  rate      -­‐‑0.109**   -­‐‑0.089**   0.047   -­‐‑0.093*  
      (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.06)   (0.06)  
#  of  respondents   62978              
#  of  countries   25              
BIC   141861.15              
Log  likelihood   -­‐‑70792.44              
Multinomial  logit  estimates  with  standard  errors  in  parentheses.  
Levels  of  statistical  significance:  *  p≤0.10;  **  p≤0.05;  ***  p≤0.01.  
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